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I. INTRODUCTION
It is often said that aggrieved parties deserve to have their
day in court. Unfortunately, the resolution of many civil suits
takes far longer than a day and costs far more than a day's worth
of attorney's fees.' Arbitration has emerged as a cost-effective
alternative to the uncertainty associated with time-intensive liti-
gation,2 and courts have shown an increased willingness to en-
force mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion.3
1. Former President George Bush once quipped:
[Miost good lawyers know that the civil justice system is out of
control. In the past 20 years the number of civil lawsuits filed in
federal courts has more than doubled and today the average case
takes almost a year to be resolved. In the past year alone, the num-
ber of cases pending for up to three years increased by nearly 15%.
That means you can file a suit, have time to enroll in law school,
study three years, graduate, pass the bar and then represent your-
self in the court the day the decision is handed down.
Mhy ADR?, DISPUTE RESOLUTION ALTERNATIVES SUPERCOURSE 485, 486 (Ellis R. Mir-
sky chmn., 1993).
2. See John M. Flynt, A Solution to Force-Placed Insurance Litigation for Lenders:
Disclosure and Arbitration, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 537, 572 (1995-1996). See also Stephen A.
Hochman, ADR Options for Banks and Other Lenders, R182 ALI-ABA 59, 63 (1994).
Hochman suggests nine advantages of arbitration over litigation: (1) it offers a
quicker way to resolve disputes; (2) it saves litigation costs; (3) it avoids the uncer-
tainty associated with judicial outcomes; (4) it allows for more flexible remedies; (5)
it avoids substantial diversion of a client's energies; (6) it reduces business uncer-
tainty; (7) it helps preserve business relationships; (8) it permits confidentiality; and
(9) it avoids the risk of adverse judicial precedent. See id.
3. See generally Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (re-
quiring a consumer who sued a termite exterminator for breach of contract to arbi-
trate his claim); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (requir-
ing an employee who had signed an arbitration agreement in connection with
registering as a securities representative to arbitrate his age discrimination claim).
An "adhesion contract" is a "[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers of
goods and services on essentially 'take it or leave it' basis without affording con-
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Mandatory binding arbitration is a relatively new concept in the
financial services industry, 4 and though banks have been slow to
explore the arbitral option,5 the use of arbitration agreements in
consumer loan transactions is likely to increase.6 In turn, many
consumer advocates who oppose arbitration clauses in adhesion
contracts, arguing that they are intrinsically coercive, are likely to
challenge this growing alternative dispute resolution practice.7
In Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., the purchaser of a
mobile home financed by Green Tree successfully challenged the
validity of an arbitration agreement that was included in the fi-
nance documents.8 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it
failed to provide the minimum guarantees required to ensure
that the plaintiff could vindicate her statutory rights unencum-
bered by steep filing fees, steep arbitrators' fees, or other signifi-
cant costs of arbitration.9 This Note will explore the facts and
holding of Randolph in Part HI.10 Part HI will examine the relevant
background law, including pertinent statutory provisions and
sumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer
cannot obtain desired product or services except by acquiescing in form contract."
BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
4. See Flynt, supra note 2, at 581.
5. See Dwight Golann, Consumer Litigation in the Age of Combat Banking, 45 Bus.
LAW. 1761, 1775 (1990).
6. See Anne Brafford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts ofAdhesion:
Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwany?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331, 333 (Winter 1996).
Brafford contends, "Many consumer disputes, which often involve simple factual
issues, can be resolved quickly and relatively cheaply through arbitration. Increas-
ingly, businesses have been taking advantage of arbitration's efficiency... arbitra-
tion clauses may soon dominate consumer banking contracts." Id.
7. See id. Some plaintiff's attorneys are becoming increasingly concerned about
the fundamental fairness of the arbitration process, and have begun gathering evi-
dence to determine if arbitration firms are in fact neutral. According to Barry A.
Ragsdale, a partner with Ivey & Ragsdale in Jasper, Alabama, "I don't think merely
the fact that banks and financial institutions or employers win 80 percent of the
time means the process is unfair, but I do think it bears some scrutiny on that ba-
sis." See R. Christian Bruce, Consumer Credit: Neutralily of Arbitrators Needs Scrutiny,
Attorney Says, Calling for More Discovery, BNA BANKING REP., Aug. 23, 1999, at 303.
See also Patricia Sturdervant & Dwight Golann, Should Binding Arbitration Clauses Be
Prohibited in Consumer Contracts?, DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 4 (Summer 1994) (discussing
whether pre-dispute, binding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion
are inappropriate).
8. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999).
9. See id. at 1158.
10. See infra notes 14-50 and accompanying text.
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case holdings." Part IV will provide an analysis of the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion in Randolph and address conflicting, but argua-
bly distinguishable, decisions from other circuits.12 Finally, this
Note will conclude that the holding in Randolph, although limited
in scope, raises a red flag to lenders who must exercise greater
care in the drafting of arbitration agreements to ensure their en-
forceability and effectiveness. 13
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp. concerns the enforce-
ability, in the context of a consumer finance agreement, of an ar-
bitration provision that is silent as to the apportionment of filing
fees, arbitrators' fees, and other significant costs of arbitration.14
Plaintiff Larketta Randolph sued Green Tree Financial Corpora-
tion and Green Tree Financial Corp. -- Alabama (collectively,
"Green Tree"), alleging that Green Tree's financing documents
violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 5 that the mandatory
arbitration requirement violated the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act,16 and that the TILA precludes arbitration of disputes arising
under the legislation.17
Ms. Randolph's complaint arose from her purchase of a
mobile home from Better Cents Home Builders, Inc., in Opelika,
Alabama, on January 25, 1994.18 She financed this purchase
through Green Tree Financial Corp. -- Alabama, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Green Tree Financial Corporation.19 The financing
documents required her to purchase "vendor's single interest"
insurance, which protects a vendor against the costs of reposses-
sion in the event of borrower default, but the TILA disclosure
11. See infra notes 51-97 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 98-123 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 124-133 and accompanying text.
14. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149,1158 (11th Cir. 1999).
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994 & Supp. 11995).
16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994).
17. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1150-1151.
18. See id. at 1151.
19. See id.
2000]
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statement failed to mention this requirement.20 In addition to
bringing the instant action,2' Ms. Randolph sought certification of
a class of individuals who had entered into similar agreements
with Green Tree.22 In response, Green True moved to compel
Ms. Randolph to arbitrate her complaint pursuant to the arbitra-
tion agreement in the finance contract.23
20. Id. The plaintiff alleged that requiring such insurance would impose an ex-
tra charge in the approximate amount of $15.00 a year, a violation of the TILA be-
cause it was not disclosed. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F.Supp.
1410, 1415 (M.D. Ala. 1997), reh'g denied 991 F.Supp. 1410, 1425-1426 (M.D. Ala.
1998), rev'd 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999).
21. The plaintiff's complaint asserted that: (1) "Green Tree is a creditor within
the meaning of TILA;" (2) "The notes and security instruments signed by plaintiff
and borrowers for the purchase of mobile homes were extensions of credit subject
to TILA;" (3) "The requirement that insurance policies contain provisions covering
Green Tree's possible repossession expenses are credit charges as defined by TILA
and occur annually when each policy is renewed;" and (4) "No TILA disclosures
were given by Green Tree." See Randolph, 991 F.Supp. at 1415 n.5 (quoting Pl.'s Am.
Compl. at 21-23).
22. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1152.
23. See id at 1151. The arbitration agreement reads, in pertinent part:
17. ARBITRATION: All disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result
from the Contract, or the validity of this arbitration clause or the
entire Contract, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one ar-
bitrator selected by Assignee with consent of Buyer(s). This arbitra-
tion Contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate com-
merce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9
U.S.C. Section 1. Judgment upon the award rendered may be en-
tered in any court having jurisdiction. The parties agree and un-
derstand that they choose arbitration instead of litigation to resolve
disputes. The parties understand that they have a right or oppor-
tunity to litigate disputes through a court, but that they prefer to
resolve their disputes through arbitration, except as provided
herein. THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY
WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL EITHER
PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PUR-
SUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY ASSIGNEE (AS PROVIDED
HEREIN). The parties agree and understand that all disputes aris-
ing under case law, statutory law, and all other laws including, but
not limited to, all contract, tort, and property disputes will be sub-
ject to binding arbitration in accord with this Contract. The parties
agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers pro-
vided by the law and the Contract ... [including] money damages,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Notwithstanding anything
hereunto the contrary, Assignee retains an option to use judicial or
non- judicial [sic.] relief to enforce a security agreement relating to
the Manufactured Home secured in a transaction underlying this
arbitration agreement, to enforce the monetary obligation secured
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. The District Court
In determining whether to compel arbitration, the district
court first considered whether enforcement of the arbitration
provision was statutorily barred.24 A two-prong test guided the
court's inquiry: first, the court had to determine whether the
agreement to arbitrate encompassed the statutory issues; second,
the court had to consider "whether legal constraints external to
the Parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those
claims." 25
With respect to the first prong, the court held that the pro-
visions of the arbitration agreement were sufficiently broad to
encompass the plaintiff's TILA, Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), and other claims, despite her argument that the provi-
sion itself failed to mention the applicable statutes.26 Turning to
the second prong, the court established that in order for Ms.
Randolph to prevail, she would have to rebut a presumption in
favor of arbitration by demonstrating that Congress intended to
preclude waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.27 Because the plaintiff failed to present any evidence from
by the Manufactured Home or to foreclose on the Manufactured
Home.... The initiation and maintenance of an action for judicial re-
lief in a court [on the foregoing terms] shall not constitute a waiver
of the right of any party to compel arbitration regarding any other
dispute or remedy subject to arbitration in this Contract, including
the filing of a counterclaim in a suit brought by Assignee pursuant
to this provision.
Id. Note that the arbitration agreement is silent as to (1) the apportionment of arbi-
tration fees and (2) what rules govern the apportionment of such fees.
24. See Randolph, 991 F.Supp. at 1416.
25. Id. (relying on Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)).
26. See id.
27. See id. The court quoted from Mitsubishi, which held that claims arising
under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 may be submitted to arbitration:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. We must as-
sume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded
by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right
to a judicial forum, that intention will be deductible from text or
2000]
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the text of the TILA or its legislative history indicating such an
intention, and because she failed to establish an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the purposes of the TILA, the court held
that she failed to meet her burden of showing why the arbitration
provision should not be enforced.28 The court thus held that the
enforcement of the provision was not statutorily barred.29
Next, the court considered whether or not the arbitration
provision was supported by consideration and whether or not
the plaintiff knowingly consented to arbitration.30 In support of
her contention that the arbitration provision lacked considera-
tion, the plaintiff argued that since Green Tree was not required
to arbitrate, the provision was unenforceable for lack of mutual-
ity of obligation.31 In holding that ample consideration existed to
support enforcement of the provision, the court noted that Ala-
bama state law, applicable in the instant action, does not require
mutuality in arbitration provisions.32 Turning to the issue of con-
sent, the court held that the plaintiff's failure to read what she
signed did not insulate Ms. Randolph from her contractual obli-
gations, including the agreement to arbitrate.33 Therefore her ar-
gument that she did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to
legislative history.
See id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628,105 S. Ct. at 3354).
28. See Randolph, 991 F.Supp. at 1417.
29. See id. at 1415.
30. See id. at 1421-1423.
31. See id. at 1421.
32. See id. at 1422. Here the court relied on Marcrum v. Embny, 282 So.2d 49
(Ala. 1973), which held, in pertinent part:
[Miutuality in a contract does not mean equal rights under the con-
tract, or that each party is entitled to the same rights or covenants
under the contract. So long as there is a valuable consideration
moving from one side to the other, or there are binding promises
on the part of each party to the other, there is adequate considera-
tion for a valid contract.
Marcrum, 282 So.2d at 51. The Fourth Circuit has also held that strict mutuality of
obligation is not required to enforce an arbitration clause. See Johnson v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373,378 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a mutual promise to
arbitrate constitutes sufficient consideration to enforce an arbitration agreement).
33. See Randolph, 991 F.Supp. at 1423. Here the court relied on Coleman v. Pru-
dential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1986), (holding that "absent a
showing of fraud or mental incompetence, a person who signs a contract cannot
avoid her obligations under it by showing that she did not read what she signed").
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the agreement to arbitrate failed.34
Based on these statutory and contractual considerations,
the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice, declined
her petition for class certification, and compelled her to submit
her claims to binding arbitration pursuant to the arbitration pro-
vision in the finance contract.35 The district court later denied the
plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration.36
B. The Court of Appeals
Ms. Randolph appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, and Green Tree moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.37 Green Tree argued that the court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction because the district court's ruling was not a "final de-
cision."38 Green Tree drew a distinction between "embedded"
proceedings, in which the arbitration issue arises as part of a
broader action dealing with other issues, and "independent" pro-
ceedings, where the motion to compel arbitration is the only is-
sue before the court.39 Since the plaintiff's action alleged a sub-
stantive violation of the TILA as well as raising the arbitration
question, Green Tree argued that the instant proceeding was
"embedded," and relied on opinions from several other circuits
which have held that orders compelling arbitration in "embed-
ded" proceedings must be treated as interlocutory and non-
appealable, not as "final decisions." 40 In this question of first im-
34. See Randolph, 991 F.Supp. at 1423.
35. See id. at 1424-1425.
36. See id. at 1425-1426.
37. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1152.
38. Id. at 1153. Appeals from a distinct court's order are permissible when
there is "a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title." 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (1994).
39. Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1153.
40. Id. For circuit holdings concurring with Green Tree on the jurisdictional is-
sue, see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 135-136 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding that if the arbitrality issue arises in an embedded proceeding, the
district court order cannot be considered a final order subject to immediate appeal);
Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 143 F.3d 626, 628 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that "[tihe general rule governing what constitutes a final decision under
section 16 is that an order compelling arbitration is not final, and therefore not im-
2000] 325
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pression for the Eleventh Circuit,41 the court of appeals refused to
recognize the "embedded/independent" distinction and held
that the order compelling arbitration was an appealable final de-
cision.42
The court then turned to the question of the enforceability
of the arbitration clause, holding that since the clause failed to
provide the minimum guarantees required to ensure that Ms.
Randolph could vindicate her statutory rights under the TILA,
the clause was unenforceable. 43 First, the court conceded a strong
federal policy toward arbitration. 44 However, the court then
cited precedent that held that some procedural flaws erect such
barriers to a would-be litigant's exercise of her statutory rights
that they render the arbitration clause unenforceable.45 The court
held that forcing the plaintiff to bear the brunt of "hefty" arbitra-
tion costs and "steep filing fees" presents such barriers.46 The
court then stated that the clause in the instant action: (1) said
nothing about the payment of filing fees or the apportionment of
mediately reviewable, if the arbitrality issue is 'embedded'[.J"). But compare Armijo
v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 72 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1995) (treating
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's remaining claims as an appealable final
decision); Arnold v. Arnold Corp. - Printed Communications for Business, 920 F.2d
1269 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the court had jurisdiction over an order compel-
ling arbitration in an embedded proceeding, relying on the fact that the district
court had entered final judgment and had "nothing left... to do but execute the
judgment").
41. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1154.
42. Id. at 1156-1157. The Fourth Circuit recognizes the "embed-
ded/independent" distinction. See Jones v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., No. 98-2704,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8265, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 29,1999); Pisgah Contractors, Inc. v.
Rosen, 117 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1997).
43. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158.
44. See id. at 1157.
45. See id. The court relied on Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134
F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998), discussed infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
46. Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158. By way of example, the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) charges a filing fee based on the amount of the claim or coun-
terclaim, ranging from $500 on claims below $10,000 to a negotiated amount for
claims in excess of $5 million. The case filing or set-up fee is $150 per party. Addi-
tionally, the parties are charged a fee based on the number of hours of mediator
time. The hourly fee is for the compensation of both the mediator and the AAA and
varies according to region. The expenses of the AAA and the mediator, if any, are
generally borne equally by the parties, who may vary this arrangement by agree-
ment. See American Arbitration Association, Commercial Dispute Resolution
Procedures (visited Dec. 30, 1999)
<http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial /commercialrules.html>.
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
other costs of arbitration; (2) failed to assign initial responsibility
for filing fees or arbitrators' costs; (3) provided no waiver in cases
of financial hardship; (4) was silent as to whether consumers,
should they prevail, would be saddled with fees and costs in ex-
cess of any award; and (5) failed to designate what set of rules
would apply, which would have offered some guidance as to the
apportionment of fees.47 Based on these five considerations, the
court declined to enforce Green Tree's arbitration clause, re-
versed the district court's decision, and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.48 Because it re-
solved the case on these bases, the court deferred addressing the
question of whether the TILA precludes arbitration in all cases
where rights are asserted under the Act.49 Green Tree petitioned
the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in January 2000.50
III. BACKGROUND LAW
Arbitration is a process that permits would-be litigants to
voluntarily submit their legal dispute to a private, neutral third-
party for a resolution as binding as a judgment on the merits.5' It
differs from mediation because the arbitrator's decision is final,
binding the parties to the award that results from the process and
providing for court enforcement of the decision.52 Its major ad-
vantage over litigation is flexibility, permitting the parties to tai-
47. See Randolph, 178 F.3d. at 1158.
48. See id. at 1159.
49. See id. The issue of whether the TILA precludes arbitration in all cases
where rights are asserted under the Act is discussed infra notes 87-97 and accompa-
nying text.
50. See Telephone Interview with C. Knox McLaney Ill, Counsel for Larketta
Randolph Gan. 24,2000) [hereinafter Telephone Interview: McLaney].
51. See Flynt, supra note 2, at 569 (quoting Henry C. Strickland et. al., Modem
Arbitration for Alabama: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 25 Cumb. L. Rev. 59, 60 n.2
(1994)). Flynt outlines the course a typical arbitration follows: "(1) the disputing
parties elect to have an arbitrator decide the dispute; (2) the parties select an arbitra-
tor; (3) the arbitrator accepts written arguments and hears the dispute; (4) the arbi-
trator makes a binding decision; and (5) the arbitrator's decision is as final and en-
forceable as a judgment." Id.
52. See id. at 570.
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lor the process to their dispute.5 3 Since most arbitration decisions
are private, they decrease the level of attention that lawsuits gen-
erate, allowing the disputing parties to settle the controversy qui-
etly without engaging in costly, time-consuming and uncertain
litigation- 4
A. The Federal Arbitration Act: History and Effect
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs whether statu-
tory claims under federal law can be subject to arbitration.5 5 The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925,56 and the leg-
islation was reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title IX of the
United States Code. 7  "Its purpose was to reverse the long-
standing judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had ex-
isted at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts[.]"5 8 Congress sought to put an agreement to arbitrate
"upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs."59
Section 2 of the FAA states that arbitration agreements, "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."60 Sec-
tion 3 authorizes federal district courts, upon application of a
party, to stay proceedings regarding "any issue referable to arbi-
tration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration... un-
til such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement." 6' Section 4 grants federal district courts the
53. See id. at 570; see also Hochman, supra note 2, at 61.
54. See Flynt, supra note 2, at 570-571.
55. See Josh R. Lubin, Note, The Legality of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in In-
dividual Employment Contracts, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1997).
56. See Brafford, supra note 6, at 334.
57. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,1470 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
58. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651
(1991)). For an introductory account of the ancient roots of modem arbitration,
including treatment of the subject during ancient tribal, Roman Empire, and me-
dieval times, see Michael A. Landrum and Dean A. Trongard, Judicial Morphallaxis:
Mandatory Arbitration and Statuton Rights, 24 WM. MITCHELL LAW REVIEW 345, 352-
354 (1998).
59. Brafford, supra note 6, at 334 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
60. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
61. See id. at§3.
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power to compel arbitration "upon being satisfied that the mak-
ing of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue."62 "These provisions manifest a 'liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."' 63
The 1985 Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. firmly established the highest
court's support for the arbitration of federal statutory claims.64
The Court ruled in Mitsubishi that once a party has made
an agreement to arbitrate, the party should be held to it, unless
that party can show that "Congress itself has evinced an inten-
tion to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue."65 The burden is on the party opposed to arbitra-
tion to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judi-
cial remedies, an intention that can be found, if it all, in the stat-
ute's text, its legislative history, or an "'inherent conflict"'
between arbitration and the underlying purpose of the statute.66
Throughout such an inquiry, however, all "'questions of arbitral-
62. See id. at § 4.
63. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
64. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985). See Brafford, supra note 6, at 339-342, for a detailed treatment of the case.
The following excerpt provides the context for the Supreme Court's historic deci-
sion:
Mitsubishi and Soler had entered into a distributorship agreement
which contained an arbitration clause binding the parties to arbi-
trate all disputes in Japan. When an antitrust dispute arose, Soler
challenged its arbitrality on two grounds. First, Soler argued that
its arbitration clause did not cover the antitrust dispute because "as
a matter of law a court may not construe an arbitration agreement
to encompass claims arising out of statutes designed to protect a
class to which the party resisting arbitration belongs unless [that
party] has expressly agreed to arbitrate those claims." Second,
Soler argued that even if the arbitration clause covered antitrust
disputes, as a matter of law, antitrust disputes are unsuitable for
arbitration.
Id. at 340 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625).
65. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. The Court added, "By agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the stat-
ute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."
Id.
66. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,227 (1987)).
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ity must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration.'" 67
B. The FAA and Contracts of Adhesion
Perhaps the most significant legacy left by the Mitsubishi
Court is the case's lingering effect on arbitration provisions
found in consumer contracts of adhesion.68 In Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corporation, the Supreme Court held that "a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)69 ... can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursu-
ant to an arbitration agreement contained in a securities registra-
tion application." 70 The Gilmer Court rejected the arguments that
arbitration procedures in general are inadequate to resolve con-
flicts and that arbitration agreements should be invalidated be-
cause the contracting relationship involved unequal bargaining
power.71 Relying heavily on Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court
stated, "'So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindi-
cate [his or her] statutory causes of action in the arbitral forum,
the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function."' 72
C. Arbitration and the Apportionment of Arbitral Fees
Consumer contentions that arbitration clauses are uncon-
67. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
68. See Brafford, supra note 6, at 342.
69. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. Robert Gilmer was required by his employment
with Interstate/Johnson Lane (IJL) Corporation to register as a securities represen-
tative with several stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). See id. His registration application, entitled "Uniform Application for Se-
curities Industry Registration or Transfer," required that Gilmer submit to arbitra-
tion any dispute, claim or controversy arising between him and his employer. See
id. Gilmer, terminated in 1987 at the age of 62, brought suit in federal court alleging
that IJL discharged him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA). See id. at 23-24.
71. See id. at 29-34.
72. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637).
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scionable because they impose an unreasonable financial burden,
and therefore effectively deny consumers an affordable forum,
have been made with increasing frequency in the past three
years. 73 In Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, the Eleventh
Circuit conceded that "arbitration may bring hardships for liti-
gants along with potential efficiency," but some "inherent weak-
nesses" in the procedural apparatus of an arbitration "should not
make an arbitration clause unenforceable." 74 Nevertheless, the
court held in Paladino that "[w]hen an arbitration clause has pro-
visions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute,... the ar-
bitration clause is not enforceable."75 The plaintiff in Paladino
was fired by the defendant, Avnet, and filed a lawsuit after secur-
ing a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.7 6 When the plaintiff refused to arbitrate the claim,
Avnet moved for a stay and to compel arbitration pursuant to the
Title IX legislation.77 The Eleventh Circuit court held that be-
cause the defendant may be liable for at least half of the hefty
cost of arbitration and must, according to the American Arbitra-
tion Association rules that the clause adopts, pay steep filing
fees,78 such costs do not comport with the statutory policy of
providing the plaintiff with a forum in which to vindicate his
rights.79 The court concluded that an arbitration agreement
which "deprives an employee of any hope of meaningful relief,
while imposing high.costs on the employee .. .is not enforce-
able."80
The concerns expressed by the court in Paladino comport
with recent decisions from two other federal circuits. In Shankle
73. See Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230
(10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th
Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
74. Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1056.
77. See id. at 1060. The statutory authority Avnet cited in its motion was 9
U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1994).
78. In this case, $2000. See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062. See also supra note 46 for
a discussion of the AAA's filing fee schedule.
79. See Paladino at 1062.
80. Id.
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v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that a "fee-splitting" provision of an
arbitration agreement substantially limited an employee's use of
the arbitral forum and therefore rendered the arbitration agree-
ment unenforceable. 8' In Cole v. Burns International Security Ser-
vices, Inc., the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals required the em-
ployer to bear the sole costs of an arbitrator's fees where the
arbitration was imposed by the employer, but declined to ad-
dress whether an arbitrator's refusal to waive filing and other
administrative fees could preclude enforcement of the arbitration
agreement.82
D. Arbitration of Consumer Finance Agreements
In Badie v. Bank of America, the Appellate Department of the
California Superior Court upheld Bank of America's arbitration
clause, ruling that even though the contracts between the bank
and its credit card customers were contracts of adhesion, the
bank's modification to add an arbitration clause was not uncon-
scionable because both the clause and its provisions were within
the reasonable expectations of the customers.83 The decision
suggests that courts will be unwilling to strike down arbitration
clauses in consumer finance transactions simply because they are
contained in adhesion contracts.84 The case also suggests that
81. 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-1235 (10th Cir. 1999). The court, citing to Gihner,
added:
[A]rbitration of statutory claims works because potential litigants
have an adequate forum in which to resolve their statutory claims
and because the broader social purposes behind the statute are ad-
hered to. This supposition falls apart, however, if the terms of an
arbitration agreement actually prevent an individual from effec-
tively vindicating his or her statutory rights. Accordingly, an arbi-
tration agreement that prohibits the use of the judicial forum as a
means for resolving statutory claims must also provide for an effec-
tive and accessible alternative forum.
Id. at 1234.
82. See Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484-85 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
83. See Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 944916, 1994 WL 660730, at *1 (Cal. Super.
Aug. 18,1994).
84. See Brafford, supra note 6, at 347.
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consumers "will have to allege more than the presence of an arbi-
tration agreement in an adhesion contract to avoid dismissal."85
Though Badie was considered a high-priority case in the financial
services industry, it was ordered unpublished, leaving many
lenders to speculate as to its weight.86
E. Arbitrality and Class Certification of Claims Arising Under the
TILA
Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)87 in 1968
to promote uniformity in the disclosure of credit terms.8 8 Only a
handful of U.S. District Court cases have addressed the question
of whether or not the TILA precludes arbitration of disputes aris-
ing under the legislation, and none has answered the question
affirmatively.8 9 The issue is likely to garner increased attention in
the federal courts in the next several years.90
In Sagal v. First USA Bank, the U.S. District Court in Dela-
ware refused to carve out an exception to the FAA that would
85. Id. at 348.
86. See id. In fact, the California Court of Appeal later held that because the
Bank's procedure for implementing the arbitration provision did not result in an
unambiguous and unequivocal waiver by cardholders of their constitutional right
to a jury trial, the arbitration did not become part of the cardholder agreement and
could not be enforced against the cardholders. See Badie v. Bank of America, 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 291 (1998).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994 & Supp. 11995).
88. The Act clearly states its purpose in § 1601:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced
and the competition among the various financial institutions and
other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be
strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use of
credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers.
It is the purpose of [Truth in Lending] to assure a meaningful dis-
closure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against
inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.
Id.
89. See Thompson v. Ill. Title Loans, Inc., No. 99-C-3952, 2000 WL 45493, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2000); Sagal v. First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F.Supp.2d 627,632 (D. Del.
1999); Lopez v. Plaza Finance Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073, at *1 (N.D. Il.
Apr. 25,1996).
90. See Telephone Interview: McLaney, supra note 50.
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preclude TILA claims from the arbitral forum.91 The court relied
on Moses H. Cone and McMahon in finding that, "'in light of the
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,"' the bur-
den was on the plaintiff to show that Congress intended to make
an exception to the FAA by "'preclud[ing] a waiver of judicial
remedies'" arising out of the TILA.92 The plaintiff in Sagal failed
to reach this burden.93
The plaintiff in Sagal also failed to demonstrate an inherent
right to class action certification as a way to enforce the TILA,
though the court conceded the usefulness of class actions in that
regard.94 The court could not find a "congressional command" to
preserve class action suits at the expense of the FAA.95 The court
relied in part on Lopez v. Plaza Finance Co., where the U.S. District
Court held that the TILA does not establish a statutory right to
certify a class. 96 The court in Lopez relied on Champ v. Siegel Trad-
ing Co., which held that "[w]here an enforceable arbitration
clause allows only for individual arbitration, a class will not be
certified."97
91. See Sagal at 632.
92. Id. at 631 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220,226-227 (1987)).
93. See id at 632.
94. See id.
95. Id. The court held that although 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1994) expressly pro-
vides for a recovery cap of $500,000 on TILA class action claims, nothing in either
the statutory language or the legislative history provided for a statutory right to
bring class actions. See id.
96. See Lopez, 1996 WL 210073, at *3.
97. Id. (citing Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 276-277 (7th Cir.
1995). See also Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/American Express, Inc., 634 F.Supp.
1048 (N.D. Ga. 1986), affd, Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d. 718, 725 n.5
(11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the right to arbitration is contractual and therefore
substantive, and thus can not be overridden by class action certification). It should
be noted, however, that Champ involved a suit arising under the Commodity Ex-




A. How Deadly is Silence? Prospective v. Retrospective "Minimum
Guarantees" Test
Randolph stands for the proposition that arbitration agree-
ments in consumer finance transactions that are silent as to the
apportionment of arbitral fees and costs are unenforceable. 98 The
test for enforceability established by the court is whether or not
the arbitration agreement presents such high barriers to the al-
ternative forum so as to deny the plaintiff the opportunity to
vindicate her statutory rights.99 It was Green Tree's silence as to
the apportionment of arbitral fees and costs that created such a
barrier in Randolph; the mere specter that such expenses would be
prohibitive, even in the absence of a clear record establishing
such expenses, was enough to spook the Eleventh Circuit into
striking down the validity of the arbitration agreement.100 Thus
the court has articulated a prospective "minimum guarantees"
test for the enforceability of an arbitration clause in consumer fi-
nance agreements, where the mere possibility that a consumer
may be required to pay steep arbitration fees and costs, and
therefore may be deterred from vindicating her statutory rights
in the arbitral form, is sufficient to invalidate the clause.' 10
The First, Second and Seventh Circuits, however, have re-
jected this prospective "minimum guarantees" test in favor of a
retrospective one: a challenge to arbitrator fees should not be
made unless such expenses have actually been imposed on a
claimant.10 2 The mere fact that a consumer faces the possibility of
being charged arbitration fees, including sharing the arbitrator's
98. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. The phrase "prospective 'minimum guarantees' test" has been created by
the author as a shorthand way of referring to the test established by Randolph.
102. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1,
15-16 (1st Cir. 1999); Arakawa v. Japan Network Group, 56 F.Supp.2d 349, 354
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir.
1999). Each case deals with arbitration clauses in the employment contract context.
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compensation if directed to do so by the arbitrator, does not
make the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable as a matter of
law. 03 Fee-splitting arrangements are only contrary to a plain-
tiff's ability to vindicate her statutory rights if the fees are so
great, and the plaintiff's financial situation so dire, that the impo-
sition of fees would make the plaintiff unable to, or would sub-
stantially deter plaintiff from seeking to, enforce her rights.10 4
Because the arbitral panel may not require the plaintiff to pay
fees, and because judicial review is available to the plaintiff after
arbitration if she believes excessive fees have been levied against
her, the mere possibility that the consumer will have to pay these
fees is not sufficient to invalidate an arbitration clause.105
B. Silence Can Be Golden
In Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corporation, decided and
filed only nine days after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Randolph, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an arbitra-
tion agreement, appearing in a consumer loan transaction virtu-
ally identical to the one in Randolph, that was also silent as the
apportionment of arbitral fees.106 The plaintiffs in Harris0 7
brought suit against Green Tree and others under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 08 alleging
they were the victims of a fraudulent home improvement
scheme.10 9 Like the Randolphs, the Harrises sought certification
of a class of all others similarly situated." 0
Utilizing a conventional mutuality and unconscionability
analysis under contract law, the Third Circuit held that the arbi-
103. See Arakawa, 56 F.Supp.2d at 354.
104. See id. at 355.
105. See Lagatree v. Luce, 74 Cal.App.4th 1105,1135 (1999).
106. See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 1999). For
the complete text of the arbitration provision, see 183 F.3d at 177-178.
107. Charles Harris, Christine Harris, Willie Davis, and Nora Wilson (collec-
tively, the "Harrises"). See id. at 176.
108.18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
109. See Harris, 183 F.3d at 176.
110. See id. at 173.
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tration clause was not "so unreasonably favorable to Green Tree
as to make the clause... unconscionable.""' The court held that:
(1) mutuality is not a requirement of a valid arbitration clause as
long as the requirement of consideration is met;" 2 (2) the clause
was not procedurally unconscionable even though it appeared on
the back of the relevant standard form contract; 13 and (3) the
clause was not substantively unconscionable even though it al-
lowed Green Tree, but not the plaintiffs, the right to litigate dis-
putes, and even though Green Tree did not have to obtain the
consent of the plaintiffs in selecting the arbitrator."4
Given the similarities in Randolph and Harris -- the common
corporate defendant, the substantial similarity between the arbi-
tration clauses in question, the negligible passage of time be-
tween which the decisions were filed - the sharp differences be-
tween the two holdings are particularly shocking, at least at first
blush. There are, however, at least four potential explanations
for the contradictory outcomes in Randolph and Harris:
1. Harris was argued over eight months before
Randolph was decided, and therefore the
plaintiffs in Harris were unable to utilize the
Randolph holding as persuasive authority;" 5
2. The plaintiffs in Harris never argued that ar-
bitral expenses chilled their ability to pursue
their statutory rights;1 6
3. Instead, the Harrisses relied exclusively on
traditional mutuality and unconscionability
111. Id. at 184.
112. See id. at 180-181.
113. See id. at 182-183.
114. See id. at 183-184.
115. Randolph was decided and filed on June 22, 1999. Harris was argued on
September 17, 1998. Filed nine days after Randolph on July 1, 1999, Harris makes no
reference to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Randolph.
116. Electronic correspondence from Alan S. Kaplinsky, Counsel for Green Tree
Financial Corp. in Harris Uan. 24,2000) (on file with the author).
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arguments, which were predictably unper-
suasive;117
4. The plaintiff in Randolph, unlike those in Har-
ris, could benefit from the Paladino holding,
binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit that
arguably made it easier for the Randolphs to
persuade the court that the specter of steep
fees and costs prevented them from vindicat-
ing their statutory rights.
In light of these considerations, is it possible to envision a
different outcome in Harris had the plaintiff been able to argue
Randolph? The answer, of course, would turn on the Third Cir-
cuit's acceptance or rejection of the prospective "minimum guar-
antees" test embraced by the Eleventh Circuit, but rejected by
three other circuits. Assuming, arguendo, that the Third District
were to adopt the Eleventh Circuit's prospective test, it is possi-
ble that Green Tree's arbitration clause, substantially similar to
the provision at issue in Randolph, would be subject to a success-
ful attack, and silence would not be so "golden" after all.
C. Beyond Consumers -- Should Lenders Be Worried About Com-
mercial Contracts?
Does the holding in Randolph apply beyond the consumer
and employment contracts context? The decision itself suggests
"no," explicitly distinguishing its holding from earlier cases in-
volving commercial entities.118 In making this determination the
117. For example, the Third Circuit stated in Harris that, "[ojur finding... that
mutuality is not a requirement of a requirement of a valid arbitration clause is con-
sistent with that of most other federal courts that have considered this issue," and
proceeded to cite precedents from several of the Circuits. Harris, 183 F.3d at 180.
The superior tactic, implied by Randolph, is not to attack the arbitration clause on
the general grounds of unconscionability, but rather on the grounds that the clause
prevents the plaintiff from vindicating specific statutory rights. See Randolph, 178
F.3d at 1159.
118. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158-1159.
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court cited two Second Circuit decisions, Doctor's Associates, Inc.
v. Stuart and Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Hamilton, which both up-
held the validity of arbitration clauses in franchisee agree-
ments.119 Both Doctor's Associates cases involved Subway
sandwich shop franchisees who opposed the franchisor's arbitra-
tion agreement on the grounds of excessive arbitral expenses. 120
In Stuart, the Second Circuit held that the defendants were on
notice that they were "liable for their own costs in the arbitration
proceeding" and that they could have inquired about the typical
fees charged by the American Arbitration Association prior to
signing the franchisee agreement.' 2' The court in Hamilton relied
on Stuart in ruling that the arbitration agreement was enforceable
even where plaintiff's estimated total costs of arbitration were
between $28,000 and $32,000.122 Underlying these decisions is the
assumption that commercial entities have relatively equal bar-
gaining power and can effectively negotiate with each other be-
fore obligating themselves to resolve disputes in the arbitral fo-
rum.'23 Such freedom of contract obviates the need to extend
judicial protections enjoyed by consumers and employees to
commercial entities.
V. CONCLUSION
How is Randolph likely to affect the use of mandatory,
binding arbitration in the consumer finance agreement context?
The answer may depend on whether lenders consider the arbitral
glass half-empty or half-full. Pessimists might interpret the Elev-
enth Circuit's ruling as a powerful new arrow in the quiver of
consumers intent on evading arbitration and may question the
119. See Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2nd Cir. 1998); Doctor's
Assoc., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2nd Cir. 1996);
120. See Hamilton, 150 F.3d at 163; Stuart, 85 F.3d at 980.
121. Stuart, 85 F.3d at 981. The court so held despite receiving evidence that the
AAA charges as much as $5,000 for filing and administration fees in Connecticut.
See id. at 980.
122. See Hamilton, 150 F.3d at 163-164.
123. See EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION: THE ADVocATE's PERSPECTIVE 333 (1997).
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wisdom of including arbitration clauses that seem to spawn as
much litigation as they seek to avoid. Optimists, however, rec-
ognize the limited nature of the Randolph holding, particularly on
such specific facts: not only was Green Tree's arbitration clause
silent as to the apportionment of fees, it also failed to direct the
court to a set of rules that may have cured the agreement's si-
lence. In light of the unwillingness of other courts to adopt the
Eleventh Circuit's prospective "minimum guarantees" test, the
Randolph holding may be interpreted as no more than a red flag
to lenders, alerting them to the importance of careful arbitration
clause drafting that is mindful of consumers' ability to pay arbi-
tral expenses. In other words, though silence can be deadly, it
can also be cured.
Thus, Randolph provides lenders, and the legal practitioners
who represent them, with a fresh incentive to review the arbitra-
tion clauses they are using (or considering using) in consumer
finance agreements. Practitioners should present their clients
with a menu of arbitration clause options, pointing out the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each.
A. Maintain Silence as to the Apportionment of Fees and Costs
In light of Harris, and coupled with the unwillingness of
several courts to adopt the prospective "minimum guarantees"
test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, it may be tempting to inter-
pret Randolph as an anomaly that presents no long-term threat to
the viability of arbitration provisions that are silent as to the ap-
portionment of arbitral expenses. Indeed, a growing body of case
law demonstrates that several courts are unsympathetic toward
consumers who allege an inability to pay arbitration costs. 24
124. These decisions do not necessarily pertain to arbitration clauses that are si-
lent as to the apportionment of fees, however. See First Family Fin. Servs. Inc. v.
Rogers, 736 So.2d 553, 559-560 (Ala. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff, confronted
with an arbitration provision that did apportion arbitral expenses, presented insuf-
ficient evidence of financial hardship to render an arbitration clause unenforceable);
Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 736 So.2d 564, 569-570 (Ala. 1999)
(holding that, with respect to an arbitration clause that referenced the commercial
rules of the American Arbitration Association as controlling, the trial court erred in
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This strategy, however, fails to appreciate that the fundamental
purpose of an arbitration is to avoid litigation entirely. As long
as arbitration clauses remain silent as to the apportionment of
arbitral expenses, consumers will rely on Randolph at least long
enough to litigate the arbitration clause enforceability issue, thus
defeating the purpose for including such clauses in finance
agreements in the first place.
B. Make Arbitration Either Voluntary or Non-binding
One way to ensure that arbitration does not prevent a con-
sumer from vindicating statutory rights in an affordable forum is
to make arbitration a voluntary, as opposed to a mandatory,
process. By way of example, the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers gives its employees a choice to have their civil rights
claims heard either in the judicial or the arbitral forum.'2 Volun-
tary arbitration programs, however, can suffer from under-
utilization, which may affect their ability to be a cost-effective al-
ternative to litigation.126
Lenders may also consider making arbitration non-
binding, permitting consumers to seek a judicial remedy when
dissatisfied with the arbitral one.127 The argument is that if the
shifting the burden of paying the arbitration filing fee from the consumer to the
defendant auto dealer); Wirdzek v. Monetary Mgmt. of Cal., Inc., No. CV-F-99-
5415-REC-LJO, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8455 (E.D. Cal. May 25,1999). In Wirdzek, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California found no unconscionability
in an arbitration clause, silent as to the apportionment of fees, which may have re-
sulted in the plaintiff's administrative costs exceeding the worth of the claim - ap-
proximately $500.00. See Wirdzek at *6. Wirdzek is distinguishable from Randolph,
however, in that the underlying cause of action was a state contractual claim, gov-
emed by Pennsylvania substantive law. See id. at *2-3. Thus, unlike Randolph, no
conflict existed between the federal policies favoring arbitration and providing
plaintiffs with an affordable forum in which to vindicate their statutory rights.
125. See Lubin, supra note 55, at 1039. Alan Kaplinsky, an attorney with Ballard
Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll LLP in Philadelphia, PA argues, "I believe very
strongly is should not be mandatory; it should be elective. You should give either
the consumer or the company the right to elect arbitration." Bruce, supra note 7, at
303.
126. See Brafford, supra note 6, at 360. See also Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590
N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ohio 1992) (holding that non-binding arbitration is an oxymo-
ron, and a contract providing for such arbitration is unenforceable).
127. For a detailed treatment, see Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Be-
tween Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10
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arbitrator's decision were not final, the arbitration procedure
would seem more legitimate to the average consumer, who
would likely not have the stamina to pursue a judicial remedy
even if dissatisfied with the arbitral decision.128 Financial institu-
tions ultimately may not be attracted to the lack of finality inher-
ent in non-binding arbitration, especially since such a proposal
would leave them exposed to class action claims, punitive dam-
ages, or both.129
C. Utilize Increased Care in the Drafting of Arbitration Provisions.
Green Tree may have avoided a finding that its arbitration
clause was unenforceable in Randolph if it had taken more care in
the drafting of the clause.130 Careful drafting, mindful of the
costs consumers may incur in the arbitral forum, would include
either an express provision apportioning costs, or an explicit ref-
erence that the American Arbitration Association's (or some
other national arbitration organization's) rules control, or both.131
Consider the following model:
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 267,340 (1995).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. The language employed by the Eleventh Circuit in the Randolph dictum
suggests as much:
The arbitration clause in this case raises serious concerns with re-
spect to filing fees, arbitrators' costs and other arbitration expenses
that may curtail or bar a plaintiff's access to the arbitral form, and
thus falls within our holding in Paladino. This clause says nothing
about the payment of filing fees or the apportionment of the costs
of arbitration. It neither assigns an initial responsibility for filing
fees or arbitrators' costs, nor provides for a waiver in cases of fi-
nancial hardship. It does not say whether consumers, if they pre-
vail, will nonetheless be saddled with fees and costs in excess of
any award. It does not say whether the rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association, which provide at least some guidelines con-
cerning filing fees and arbitration costs, apply to the proceedings,
whether some other set of rules applies, or whether the parties
must negotiate their own set of rules.
Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158.
131. See Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause:
Drafting and Implementation Issues Which Should Be Considered By a Consumer Lender




COSTS OF ARBITRATION: If you start arbitration,
you agree to pay the initial filing fee required by the
American Arbitration Association up to a maximum
of $125. We agree to pay for the filing fee and any
deposit required by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation in excess of $125. After the American Arbi-
tration Association receives a Demand For Arbitra-
tion, it will bill us for the excess. We also agree to
pay the costs of the arbitration proceeding up to a
maximum of one day (eight hours) of hearings. If
we start arbitration, we will pay the filing fee, re-
quired deposit, and costs of one day of hearings.
There may be other costs during the arbitration,
such as attorney's fees, expenses of travel to the ar-
bitration, and the costs of the arbitration proceeding
that go beyond one day of hearings. The Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules determine who will pay those
fees.132
The model clause addresses several of the shortcomings of
the Green Tree arbitration clause in Randolph: (1) obviously, it is
not silent as to the payment of arbitral expenses; (2) it assigns ini-
tial responsibility for filing fees; (3) it provides for one day of
hearings at the expense of the lender (alternatively, consider in-
cluding a waiver in cases of financial hardship, a determination
to be made by the arbitrator); (4) and it references the American
Arbitration Association's rules as controlling.133 Though it is un-
132. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers, 736 So.2d 553, 556 (Ala. 1999). The
"Commercial Arbitration Rules" mentioned in the clause refer to the American Ar-
bitration Association's rules governing commercial disputes, supra note 46. Most
importantly, R-51 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules provides that the AAA may,
in the event of extreme hardship on the part of any party, defer or reduce the ad-
ministrative fees. Additionally, R-52 provides that all other expenses of the arbitra-
tion, including required travel and other expenses of the arbitrator, AAA represen-
tatives, and any witness and the cost of any proof produced at the direct request of
the arbitrator, shall be borne equally by the parties, unless they agree otherwise or
unless the arbitrator in the award assesses such expenses or any part thereof against
any specified party or parties. See supra note 46.
133. One of these rules allows the AAA to reduce or defer the fee in the event
of extreme economic hardship. See Budnitz, supra note 127, at 280 n.111. According
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clear whether such language would have saved the arbitration
clause in Randolph, it would have certainly made it more difficult
for the plaintiff to allege that the arbitral forum presented such
obstacles as to deter her from vindicating her statutory rights.
Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp. is not the death-knell
for mandatory binding arbitration of consumer finance agree-
ments. The case should serve, however, to alert lenders and oth-
ers in the financial services industry to one court's willingness to
extend protections to consumers that may not apply to commer-
cial interests. As such, consumer lenders and the practitioners
who represent them should review the arbitration clauses they
currently use in order to reduce the likelihood that unfortunate
drafting shortcomings will result in protracted litigation of clause
enforceability.
MATTHEw C. BOUCHARD
to Budnitz, setting out the provision on fees in the finance agreement, rather than
silently incorporating the AAA rules in the arbitration clause, has three advantages:
(1) it eliminates the issue from being subject to changes in AAA rules; (2) it elimi-
nates the issue of which AAA rules apply - rules in force at the time of execution,
or rules in force at the time of dispute; and (3) it alerts the consumers to the fee is-
sue, which otherwise may not occur to them, therefore providing adequate protec-
tion against "failure-to-disclose" allegations. See id.
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